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ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between R&D project performance
and the relative influence of project and functional managers across 86
matrixed teams in nine different research and development organizations.
Performance relationships are investigated for three areas of influence
within the project team as well as for influence in the overall
organization. Analyses show higher project performance when influence
over salaries and promotions is perceived as balanced between project and
functional managers. Performance reaches its highest level, however,
when organizational influence is centered in the project manager and
influence over technical details of the work is centered in the
functional manager.
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INTRODUCTION
The matrix structure was first developed in Research and Development
organizations in an attempt to capture the benefits and minimize the
liabilities of two earlier forms of organization. Both project and
functional organizations have well known advantages and disadvantages
(Marquis, 1969; Kingdon, 1973; Allen, 1977). The functional alternative,
in which departments are organized around disciplines or technologies,
enables engineers to stay in touch more easily with new developments in
those disciplines or technologies. It has, on the other hand, the
disadvantage of creating separations between technologies, making
interdisciplinary projects more difficult to coordinate.
The project form of organization overcomes this problem by grouping
engineers together on the basis of the problem or project on which they
are working, regardless of discipline. Although it makes the
coordination and integration of multidisciplinary efforts easier to
achieve) the project structure removes individuals from their
disciplinary departments. This detachment makes it more difficult for
professionals to keep pace with the most recent developments in their
underlying disciplines and results in poorer performance on longer-term
technical efforts (Marquis & Straight, 1965).
Forces Inherent in the Matrix
The matrix, by creating an integrating force in a program or project
office, attempts to overcome the divisions that are inherent in the basic
functional structure. In the matrix, project or program managers and
their staff are charged with the responsibility of integrating the
efforts of engineers who draw upon a variety of different disciplines and
III
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technical specialties in the development of new products or processes
(Galbraith, 1973). The managers of functional departments, on the other
hand, are responsible for making sure that the organization is aware of
the most recent developments in its relevant technologies, thereby
insuring the technical integrity of products and processes that the
program or project office is attempting to develop.
This situation often leads to conflict between the two arms of the
matrix. Project managers are often forced by market needs to assume the
shorter range view of the marketing function (cf. Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967). Since they are responsible for developing a product that can be
successfully produced and marketed, project managers take on a
perspective that is sometimes more closely aligned to that of marketing
or manufacturing than to the perspective held in the research and
development organization. Functional department heads, with their closer
attachment to underlying technologies, are inclined to take a longer term
view and consequently, may be more concerned with the organization's
capability to use the most up-to-date technologies than with meeting
immediate customer needs.
Both of these issues are necessary to the survival of the
organization. Someone has to be concerned with getting new products out
into the market, and someone has to be concerned with maintaining the
organization's long run technical capability to develop and incorporate
technical advancements into future products. Research and development
organizations, no matter how they are organized, always have both of
these concerns. The matrix structure merely makes them explicit by
vesting the two sets of concerns in separate managers.
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In formalizing these two distinct lines of managerial influence, the
R&D organization is generating "deliberate conflict" between two
essential managerial perspectives as a means of balancing these two
organizational needs (Cleland, 1968). Project managers whose prime
directive is to get the product "out the door" are matched against
functional managers who tend to hold back because they can always make
the product "a little bit better", given more time and effort (Marquis,
1969; Allen, 1977). When these two opposing forces are properly
balanced, the organization should achieve a more optimum balance both in
terms of product completion and technical excellence. Unfortunately, a
balanced situation is not easy to achieve. Often one or the other arm of
the matrix will dominate, and then, what appears to be a matrix on paper
becomes either a project or a functional organization in operation.
The net effect of matrixed forces on project performance is realized
principally by their influence over the behaviors and attitudes of
individual engineers. It is the engineers who perform the actual problem
solving activities that result in new products or processes. It is they
who ultimately determine the form of solution. How engineers view the
relative power of project and functional managers over their work lives
will strongly influence how they perform their jobs.
Individuals accrue power within organizations by controlling critical
resources and by influencing critical problem solving activities and
decisions (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1979). In any organization, including
those with matrixed relationships, employees attend more to those
managers who have more influence over technical strategies, resources,
reward and promotional decisions, and the staffing of projects (Allen,
1977; Pelz and Andrews, 1976; Oldham, 1976). From the engineer's point
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of view, then, managers will be seen as powerful and important to the
extent that they influence the detailed technical decisions of the
engineer's project work, determine his salary and promotional
opportunities, and control his assignment to particular project
activities. These are three critical areas in which project and
functional managers contend for influence, for it is through these
supervisory roles that each side of the matrix attempts to motivate and
direct the engineer's efforts and performance (Kingdon, 1973). And the
degree to which each side of the matrix is successful in building its
power within the R&D organization will have a strong bearing on the
outcomes that emerge from the many interdependent project activities
(Wilemon and Gemmill, 1971).
Although a great deal has recently been written about matrix
organizations (e.g., Souder, 1979; Hill and White, 1979), very little is
actually known about the effectiveness of these structures (Knight,
1976). In particular, there has been no research that systematically
deals with the relationships between project performance and the
distribution of power and influence within the organization. Where
should the locus of influence lie between project and functional managers
along the more critical dimensions of supervisory influence? Will a
balance in power between project and functionally oriented forces result
in higher project performance? In an attempt to answer these questions,
the present study examines the relationships between project performance
and the relative dominance of project and functional managers for 86
matrixed project teams from nine different technology-based organizations.
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HYPOTHESES
Details of Project Work
This is the arena in which matrixed project and functional interests
are most likely to come into direct conflict. The project manager has
ultimate responsibility for bringing the new product into being and is,
therefore, intimately concerned with the technical approaches used in
accomplishing that outcome. However, if the project side of the matrix
is allowed to dominate development work, two quite different problems can
develop. At one extreme, there is the possibility that sacrifices in
technical quality and long term reliability will be made in order to meet
budget, schedule, and immediate market demands (Knight, 1977). At the
other extreme, product potential is often oversold beyond the
organization's current technological capability. Both of these errors
are more likely to occur when the project side of the matrix dominates
technical decisions.
To guard against these shortcomings, functional managers can be held
accountable for the overall integrity of the product's technical
content. If the functional side of the matrix becomes overly dominant,
however, then the danger is that the product will include not only more
sophisticated but also perhaps less proven and more risky technology.
This desire to be technologically aggressive - to develop and use the
most attractive, most advanced technology - must be countered by forces
that are more sensitive to the operational environment and more concerned
with moving developmental efforts into final physical reality (Mansfield
and Wagner, 1975; Utterback, 1974).
Ill
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To balance the influence of both project and functional managers over
technical details is often a difficult task. While an engineer may
supposedly report to both managers in a formal sense, the degree to which
both managers are actively influencing the direction, clarification, or
the pursuit of technical details and solution strategies will vary
considerably from project to project, depending on the ability and
willingness of the two managers to become involved in details. Although
involvement depends, at least in part, on one's understanding of the
relevant technology and its application, project performance should be
higher when the perspectives of both sides can be taken into account.
Accordingly, the following is hypothesized:
Hl: Project performance will be higher when both project and
functional managers are seen to exert equal influence over the
detailed technical work of matrixed engineers.
Salaries and Promotions
Advocates of matrix organizations (e.g., Kingdon, 1973; Sayles, 1976;
Davis and Lawrence, 1977) have long agreed on the importance of achieving
balanced influence over salary and promotion decisions. Both Knight
(1976) and Goggin (1974) explicitly emphasize that matrix organizations
require matching control systems to support their multidimensional
structures; otherwise, they would be undermined by reward systems that
are based on assumptions of unitary authority. The underlying argument
is that should the engineer view either his project or functional manager
as having more control over his chances for salary increase and
promotion, then that manager alone is more likely to influence and direct
the engineer's behaviors and priorities.
This is one of the key issues in what are often described as 'paper
matrix" situations: management assumes that by drawing overlapping
IIIl
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structures and by prescribing areas of mutual responsibility, balance
will be achieved along appropriate supporting management systems. In
practice, however, one of the two components of the matrix comes to
dominate or appears to dominate in key areas such as determination of
salaries and promotions. It is important to stress here that it is the
engineer's perception that counts. Both sets of managers may be equally
influential in determining the actual pay increase. If only one manager,
the department head for example, calls the engineer into his office to
announce the raise, the project manager's involvement will not be
apparent and the engineer will come to believe that it is only the
department head who counts. Engineers can acknowledge and recognize the
existence of two lines of reporting, but unless they see both managers
controlling their progress in terms of income and status, there will be a
natural tendency for them, particularly in conflict situations, to heed
the desires of one manager to the neglect of the other. The matrix then
ceases to function, resulting in a structure that is more likely to
resemble the pure project or functional form of organization despite any
"paper" claims to the contrary.
Given that management has decided on a matrix form and that engineers
recognize its existence, higher performing projects should be those in
which engineers see both project and functional managers involved in the
determination of their salaries and promotions. It is therefore
hypothesized that:
H2: Project performance will be higher when both project and
functional managers are seen to exert equal influence over the
promotions and rewards of matrixed engineers.
-9-
Personnel Assignments
Personnel assignments often provide the focus for the priority
battles that frequently afflict matrix organizations. With the pressure
on them from both management and customers to produce, project managers
often find themselves in tight competition for the resources necessary to
provide results (Knight, 1977; Steiner and Ryan, 1968). One of the most
critical of these resources is technical talent. Each functional
department employs engineers of varying technical backgrounds,
experiences, and capabilities (Allen and Cohen, 1969). Every project
manager learns quickly which engineers are the top performers and
naturally wants them assigned to his project. As a result, there
develops an intense rivalry among project managers, each attempting to
secure the most appropriate and most talented engineers for his project
ti· (Cleland and King, 1968). Functional managers, on the other hand, have a
somewhat different motivation. They usually have no difficulty finding
budget to support their top performers, but they have to keep all of
their engineering staff employed. They therefore find themselves in the
position of trying to market the services of their less talented
engineers to project managers.
At this point a distinction must be made between performance at the
project level and performance at the level of the entire R&D
organization. Organizational performance might be higher when influence
over this set of decisions is shared equally by project and functional
managers. Performance of a single project will probably be higher when
that nrnit~ts' mnnaer had aratl-ar 4ftluriiw re rr nrsnnnvl a~clonman
' *_ r---J _ _6- Aircv s- 9rain -- Dc-
since presumably that project will then obtain the best talent. Since
the performance measure used in this study is at the project level, and
1--1-1' 1--- -- --' -- 
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realizing that high individual project performance may be sub-optimal for
the organization, it will be hypothesized that:
H3: Project performance will, on the average be higher when project
managers are seen to exert greater influence over personnel
assignments to the projects.
Organizational Influence
In addition to the supervisory functions that go on within a project
group, considerable research has shown that managers of high performing
projects are also influential outside their project teams (e.g., Katz and
Allen, 1982; Likert, 1967; Steiner and Ryan, 1968; Pelz, 1952).
According to these studies, managers affect the behaviors and motivations
of subordinates not only through leadership directed within the project
group but also through their organizational influence outside the project
(Katz and Tushman, 1981; Pfeffer, 1978). The critical importance of
organizational influence on project outcomes has also been confirmed by
many studies of technological innovation (e.g., Achilladelis, et. al., 
1971; Myers and Marquis, 1969). In almost every instance, successful
innovation required the strong support of organizationally powerful
managers who could provide essential resources, mediate intergroup
conflicts, and who were sufficiently well positioned to protect the
developmental effort from sources of outside interference.
Based on these findings, if either of the two arms of the matrix is
seen to have greater power in the organization at large, then the
engineers' behavior should also be affected, particularly in situations
of conflict. Engineers want to be on the "winning team" (Cf. Kidder,
1981). It is expected, therefore, that perceived organizational
influence will be an important determinant of what actually occurs in the
project, for an imbalance in organizational influence would result in
II
engineers paying greater attention and attributing greater importance to
the more powerful side of the matrix.
This does not mean that the locus of organizational influence
necessarily determines the loci of influence over work, pay, and
assignments. There may be, for example, many instances in which the less
organizationally powerful manager exerts greater influence over one of
the other dimensions. Such incongruences place matrixed engineers in
uncomfortable positions, particularly if there is strong disagreement
between their two managers. As discussed by Allen (1966), discomfort
over technical direction can often lead to postponement of critical
technical decisions and a failure to narrow the scope of technical
alternatives under consideration, resulting in lower project
performance. From an exploratory standpoint, therefore, our research
examines two important questions involving perceptions of organizational
and project work influence. First, is there a strong association between
organizational influence and the relative dominance of project and
functional managers over the rewards, personnel assignments, and
technical work of matrixed engineers? And secondly, to what extent do
these dimensions of organizational and internal dominance interact to
affect project performance? Do they independently relate to project
performance or do they interact in determining performance?
-11-
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RESEARCH METHOD
Setting
The data presented in this paper derive from a study of R&D project
teams in nine major U.S. organizations. Although the selection of
participating organizations could not be made random, they were chosen to
represent several distinct work sectors and markets. Two of the sites
are government laboratories; three are not-for-profit firms receiving
most of their funding from government agencies. The four remaining
companies are in private industry: two from the aerospace industry, one
in electronics, and one in food processing.
In each organization, initial meetings were held with higher level
research and development managers in order to understand how the R&D
organization was structured, to identify the project assignments of all
R&D professionals, and to learn the multiple reporting relationships and
managerial and technical titles of all project members. Short meetings
were then scheduled with the professionals assigned to the projects to
explain the broad purposes of our study, to solicit their voluntary
cooperation, and to distribute questionnaires to each professional
individually. To insure the accuracy of data on project assignments,
respondents were told to answer all questions in terms of the project
assignment identified on the questionnaire's front page. If this was
incorrect or not up-to-date, they replaced it with their correct project
assignment. Questionnaires were also tailored to the particular
reporting structure with language appropriate to each project group.
1 This personalized distribution was necessary to insure that each
engineer received the correct questionnaire form. It probably had
the additional side benefit of increasing the response rate.
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Project managers, functional managers, and staff engineers and scientists
received slightly different questionnaires reflecting their different
positions. Project managers, for example, were not given questions about
themselves or about the functional managers of any of their matrixed
staff.
Individuals were asked to complete the questionnaires as soon as
reasonably possible. Stamped, return envelopes were provided so that
completed forms could be mailed to the investigators directly. These
procedures not only insure voluntary participation, but they also enhance
data quality since respondents must commit their own time and effort.
Response rates across organizations were extremely high, ranging from 82
percent to a high of 96 percent.
Although these procedures yielded over 2,000 respondents from 201
project teams, over half of the projects were not organized in a matrix.
Furthermore, few of the projects were totally matrixed in the sense that
all engineers and scientists had dual reporting relationships to both
project and functional managers. Only those projects in which 20 percent
or more engineers in a pure matrix arrangement will be used in this
analysis. This gives a total of 86 projects.2 Respondents are
considered to be part of a matrix structure when they report formally to
separate project and functional managers, and when these two managers
have no direct reporting relationship between them. There were 486
matrixed engineers working on these 86 projects, an average of almost six
matrixed engineers per project.
2 On any particular question, the number of project teams from which
complete data were obtained ranged from 63 to 86.
r-
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Matrixed Relationships
Respondents were asked to indicate (on seven-point, Likert-type
scales) the degree to which their project and functional managers
influenced: 1) the technical details of their project work; 2) their
salary increases and promotions; 3) their selection to work on the
project; and 4) the overall conduct of the organization. For each of
these dimensions influence, scale responses ranged from a "1" for "my
project manager dominates" to a "7" for "my functional manager
dominates"; the middle point, "4", indicating that influence was balanced
between the two. For each question, individual member responses were
averaged to calculate overall project scores for the four influence areas
and only the responses of matrixed project members were used. As
described by Katz and Tushman (1979), analysis of variance methods were
used on all aggregated measures to insure the validity of combining
individual perceptions to derive project scores. For each dimension of
influence, lower scores will be taken to indicate project manager
dominance and higher scores to indicate functional manager dominance.
Project Performance
Since comparable measures of objective performance have yet to be
developed across different technologies, a subjective measure was used
similar to that of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Katz and Tushman
(1981). In each organization, project performance was measured by
interviewing higher level management and asking each manager (at least
one hierarchical level above the project and functional managers) to
indicate on a five-point, Likert-type scale whether a project team was
performing above, below, or at the level expected of them. Each manager
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was asked to evaluate only those projects with which he was personally
familiar and knowledgeable. Evaluations were made by individual managers
independently and submitted confidentially to the investigators. On the
average, each project was evaluated by between four and five managers.
More importantly, the evaluations show a very strong internal consensus
within each organization (Spearman-Brown reliabilities range from a low
of 0.74 a high of 0.93). It was therefore deemed safe to average ratings
of individual managers to yield reliable project performance scores. To
clarify the distinction between higher and lower project performance,
scores were normalized to a mean of zero from the original sample mean of
3.32.
RESULTS
As previously explained, matrixed engineers' responses were averaged
to classify projects on the degree to which project or functional
managers exerted influence over each of four activity areas. To examine
the way in which influence was distributed, project scores from 1 to 3
were coded as signifying dominant influence by the project manager while
scores from 5 to 7 were taken to indicate functional manager dominance.
Intermediate values from 3 to 5 were considered as balanced.
The locus of influence, as shown in Table I, varies considerably
both among projects and across dimensions of influence. The influence
over technical details of work and personnel assignments are balanced in
the majority of cases. In sharp contrast, over half of the functional
managers are seen to have greater influence over salaries and
promotions. Functional managers are viewed as controlling these rewards
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in almost 60 percent of the projects; project managers in only 7
percent. One must remember once again that it is the matrixed engineers'
perceptions of the situation that is being measured, for it is perceived
reality, not the reality itself, that influences engineers' behavior.
Table I
Distribution of Managerial Influence By
Area As Perceived By Project Members
Locus of Influence
Area of Influence Functional Project
manager Balanced manager N
1) Internal Areas of Influence
a) Technical content of project work 13.1% 50.0% 36.9% 86
b) Salaries and promotions 58.3 34.5 7.1 86
c) Personnel assignments 29.5 54.1 16.4 63
2) External Organizational Influence 30.8 38.5 30.8 78
Note: N varies by area of influence because some questions were not included
in early versions of the questionnaire.
Project managers may in fact have equal influence over salaries and
promotions, but unless this is clearly apparent to the engineer, it will
not affect his behavior.
Organizational influence, in contrast, was almost equally distributed
across the three influence categories; 31 percent of the projects having a
more dominant functional side, 31 percent having a more dominant project
side, and 38 percent having a reasonably balanced situation.
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Because the projects under investigation come from government,
non-profit, and industrial organizations, it is also important to see if
there are major differences across these sectors. Generally speaking,
there are no significant differences in the distributions of managerial
influence for the dimensions of project work details and personnel
assignments. In each sector, the distributions are consistent with the
percentages reported in Table I. The other two loci of influence, on the
other hand, vary to some degree with the type of organization. Influence
over salaries and promotions is more likely to be balanced in industrial
organizations (almost 50 percent of the projects) while project managers
have more influence over rewards in almost 43 percent of the projects in
government settings. Functional managers, in sharp contrast, dominate
rewards in over 80 percent of the projects in the not-for-profit
organizational sector.
With respect to organizational influence, matrixed engineers see
their project managers as stronger in over half of the projects in both
industrial and government organizations. Once again, however, functional
managers have greater power in the not-for-profit sector, for almost half
of the functional managers are seen as having considerably more influence
within their organizations than their project management counterparts.
None of these organizational variations is terribly surprising. The
not-for-profits with their somewhat more academic, research orientation
place greater emphasis on the disciplines and functional managers are
therefore accorded more power within these settings. In industry and
government, there is a stronger orientation toward project management,
since in both instances there is a clear-cut product or system that must
be brought into being. Project managers, therefore, tend to be given
i
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greater organizational influence and this allows them to have a stronger
voice in salary and promotion policies, as well.
Project Performance
Based on the above distributions, it is very clear that the degree to
which project or functional managers exert influence differs considerably
across projects. Locus of influence also differs for each dimension of
influence. The next step, therefore, is to test our hypotheses by seeing
how project performance varies with locus of influence on each dimension.
To examine the proposed relationships, an analysis of covariance is
performed on each dimension of internal project influence. In each case,
project performance is the dependent variable while the categories of
managerial dominance and balance (i.e., the locus of influence) represent
independent levels of variation. Since the number of engineers reporting
in a matrix format differs substantially across the projects, the number
of matrixed engineers within each project is used as a covariate.
Technical Details of Project Work. To test the extent to which
project performance varies with locus of influence over the technical of
project work, the performance means are broken down by each of the Likert
scale intervals (Table II). Performance does not vary significantly with
the locus of influence over technical content. Although there is a slight
tendency toward higher performance with moderately high influence by the
project manager or with strong influence by the functional manager,
neither of these tendencies is significant and the latter result stems
from only two, relatively small, development projects. In any event,
balanced involvement on the part of both arms of the matrix is not related
to higher project performance. Hypothesis one is not supported by the
present data.
ill
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Table II
Project Performance as a Function of the Locus of Influence
Over Technical Content of Project Work
Scale Number of Mean Project
Values Locus of Influence Projects Performance
1 - 2 Project manager 17 -0.06
2- 3 14 0.23
3 - 4 Balanced 25 -0.04
4 - 5 Balanced 17 -0.15
5 - 6 9 -0.13
6 - 7 Functional manager 2 1.12
AN OVA:
Source of Variation df F p
Influence over technical content 5 0.67 N.S.
Size of project 1 2.18 N.S.
Interaction 5 0.72 N.S.
Salaries and Promotions. In the area of salaries and promotions,
the ANOVA results of Table III show that project performance varies
significantly across the locus of managerial influence. The mean
performance levels in Table III indicate that project performance is
highest when influence is either balanced or when project managers are
viewed as controlling organizational rewards, albeit there are only four
project cases in this latter category. Nevertheless, mean performance is
significantly lower when functional managers are seen by matrixed project
members as having a more influential say over their salaries and
promotion opportunities.
IIIIIIXI----"-1_11__._ ·_.__ __
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Table III
Project Performance as a Function of the Locus of
Influence Over Salaries and Promotions
Scale Number of Mean Project
Values Locus of Influence Projects Performance
1 - 2 Project manager 4 0.78
2- 3 2 -0.37
3 - 4 Balanced 9 -0.08
4 - 5 Balanced 20 0.57
5 -6 12 -0.39
6 - 7 Functional manager 37 -0.23
ANOVA:
Source of Variation df F p
Influence over salaries 5 2.79 0.02
Size of project 1 2.65 N.S.
Interaction 5 2.00 0.09
Because the distribution of projects along the influence continuum
is so highly skewed towards functional control, Tukey's (1977) smoothing
procedures were also used to obtain a more meaningful picture of the
association between project performance and the locus of managerial
influence over salaries and promotions. An examination of the resulting
plot of smoothed performances (Figure 1) reveals a fairly regular pattern
of decreasing performance with increasing functional control over
monetary and career rewards. In support of hypothesis 2, therefore, one
can conclude from both Table III and Figure 1 that project performance is
a direct function of the degree to which project managers are seen
co-influencing the salaries and promotions of their matrixed subordinates.
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Personnel Assignments. Project performance does not vary
significantly with the locus of influence over personnel assignments
(Table IV). Although we hypothesized that project performance would be
higher when these decisions are balanced between matrixed engineers'
project and functional managers, this does not turn out to be the
case--at least not to the extent that its effects can be seen across all
project groupings. It is interesting to note, however, that the lowest
performing set of projects are those in which the functional managers are
seen as controlling the allocation of project personnel.
Table IV
Project Performance as a Function of the Locus
of Influence Over Personnel Assignments
Scale Number of Mean Project
Value Locus of Influence Projects Performance
1- 2 Project manager 5 0.02
2 - 3 5 0.06
3 - 4 Balanced 17 0.01
4 - 5 Balanced 16 0.17
5- 6 15 -0.59
6 - 7 Functional manager 3 0.45
ANOVA:
Source of Variation Df F p
Influence over personnel 5 1.03 N.S.
assignments
Size of project 1 1.90 N.S.
Interaction 5 0.87 N.S.
. . ..... .. .. , .. . . s . , . _t .. _, . a. ,J, . ..n - , . ._ . A. .. ow A.. _ s 
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Organizational Influence. To what extent is organizational
influence associated with the three measures of internal influence within
the project? The correlations in Table V show that the locus of
organizational influence is very closely related to the locus of
influence over salaries and promotions and to the locus of influence over
personnel assignments. The way in which matrixed engineers view the
relative power of project and functional managers within the organization
is not independent of how they view their managers' relative power over
organizational rewards and staffing decisions. The locus of
organizational influence is, however, independent of how matrixed members
see their project and functional managers influencing the technical
content of their work details. The correlation between these two areas
of influence is very close to zero.
Table V
Relation Between Locus of Organizational Influence and
Loci of Internal Influence Measures
Correlation of Organizational
Influence with Influence Over: r
Technical content of work -0.02
Salaries and promotions 0.65**
Personnel assignments 0.49**
*p - 0.05; **p 0.001
----·------· ------
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Since there is not a strong connection between organizational
influence and influence over technical content of the work, the final
question is whether the loci of influence in these two areas operate
separately on performance or whether they interact to affect project
performance. A two-way analysis of variance (Table VI) reveals once
again that influence over the technical details of project work is not
related, at least as a main effect, to project performance. The locus of
organizational influence, on the other hand, is significantly associated
with project performance in that projects with relatively more powerful
project managers are somewhat higher performing than are other projects.
More important, however, the ANOVA results also reveal a very strong
interaction effect on project performance between these two modes of
influence. As shown by the 2x2 table of performance means at the top of
Table VI, project performance is substantially higher when project
managers have relatively more influence within the organization and
functional managers have relatively more influence over the technical
content of what goes into the project. Performance is lowest when
functional managers are dominant in both of these areas. Additional
analyses did not uncover any interference with these findings by project
size or organization sector; nor did they uncover any other significant
interaction effects on project performance among the other influence
combinations.
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Table VI
Project Performance as a Function of the Loci of
Influence Over Technical Details of Project Work
and Influence in the Organization
Locus of Influence Over
Project Work Details
Locus of Influence
Within the Organization
Project Functional
manager manager
Project manager 0.10 0.80
N=30 N=12
Functional manager 
-0.05 
-0.59
N=30 N=12
ANOVA:
Sources of Variation df F p
Influence over technical content 1 0.36 N.S.
Influence in organization 1 4.88 0.03
Interation between work influence
and organization influence 1 6.45 0.01
Iaruna 
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DISCUSSION
The thrust of our findings suggests an ideal separation of roles
between the managers of matrixed R&D professionals. The project manager
should be concerned with external relations and activities. He or she
should have sufficient access and power within the organization to gain
the backing and continued support of higher management, to obtain
critical resources, and to coordinate and couple project efforts to
marketing and manufacturing (Cf. Achilladeles et al., 1971). The concern
of functional managers, on the other hand, should be more
inwardly-directed, focussing chiefly on the technology that goes into the
project. They should be more closely associated with the necessary
technologies, and consequently, should be better able than project
managers to make informed decisions concerning technical content.
Now these roles can never be completely separate since, for example,
relations with marketing and manufacturing have critical implications for
technical content and vice-versa. A strong working relationship must
therefore exist between project and functional managers. However, rather
than sharing responsibilities and involvement in order to achieve more
effective project performance, the results suggest that performance is
highest when project managers focus principally on external relations and
the output side of the project's work, leaving the technological input
side to be managed primarily by the functional side of the matrix.
Despite this finding, most of the projects in our sample do not have
this role separation pattern, at least as judged by matrixed project
members. In more than half of our project groups, for example, matrixed
III
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members report their project managers having substantially more influence
over the technical details of their project work than their functional
counterparts. Perhaps this should not be too surprising since it is the
project manager who manages the output and who is ultimately responsible
for the project's success. It is, moreover, his reputation and career
that are most intimately tied to project outcomes. Nevertheless,
according to our study, performance would be higher if project managers
accepted greater influence from functional managers who have engineering
personnel assigned to their projects and who should have better knowledge
of the technologies.
The enhanced role of the functional manager should also provide some
additional benefit in mitigating one of the characteristic problems long
inherent in matrix organizations. Functional managers have often felt
threatened by the introduction of the matrix. Where they formerly had
power and visibility in their functional structures, they see, under the
matrix, a drift of all of this "glamour" to the project side of the
organization. As a result, the matrix has often been defeated by
recalcitrant or rebellious department heads, who saw the technical
content of their responsibilities diminishing and their careers sinking
into an abyss of personnel decisions and human relations concerns. With
a clear delineation of technical responsibilities and an explicitly
defined contributive role for functional managers in the technical
content of projects, this problem may well be alleviated.
Over the years, there has been considerable discussion concerning
the need to maintain a balance of power in matrix organizations. Very
little has been done, however, to investigate the elements or components
of power and influence that should be balanced. Using project
·W II__·_I XsL _________II____I_1I__I___XIIIII· 1_1·^ -
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performance as our criterion, the present study looked into the effect of
balance or imbalance along four dimensions of influence. The results,
surprisingly enough, provide very little support for the theories of
balanced responsibility. Except for joint influence over the area of
salary and promotion, higher project performance is not associated with a
balanced state of influence along any of the other three dimensions of
supervisory activity.
Where does this leave all of the theories and propositions regarding
matrix balance? The final set of results in Table VI leads to a better
understanding of how balance of power should be achieved to make the
matrix effective. It is not through mutual balance or joint
responsibilities along single dimensions of influence; rather it is
through role differentiation between dimensions of influence that the
matrix must be made to work. The project manager's role is distinctly
different from that of a functional manager. The two should have very
different concerns and should relate to both the project and the larger
organization in distinctly different ways. It makes sense, therefore,
that the influence which they exert over the behavior of matrixed project
members should be along different dimensions.
The project manager is concerned with gaining resources and
recognition for the project and with linking it to other parts of the
business to ensure that project direction fits the overall business plan
of the organization. His is an outward orientation, and therefore,
project performance should be greater when the project manager has
greater outward organizational influence.
The functional manager should be concerned with technical excellence
and integrity, managing the project's input in terms of state-of-the-art
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technology. The functional manager's orientation, therefore, is an
inward one, focussing on the technical content of the project. The
detailed technical decisions must be made by those who are closest to the
technology. This localization of technical decision-making in functional
departments necessarily implies an important integrating role for the
project manager. It is his responsibility to make sure that the
technical decisions overseen by several different functional managers all
fit together and to avoid sub-optimization. Clearly, the greater the
project manager's organizational influence, the easier it will be for him
to integrate and negotiate among functional managers whose technical
goals may sometimes conflict.
CONCLUSIONS
This study provides a clearer understanding of what balance of power
in a matrix organization means. When two lines of reporting exist in an
organization, some locus of influence must exist between them. If,
however, one or the other side of the matrix dominates completely, then
the matrix essentially disappears and lower project performance will
probably result. What is also clear from our findings is that balanced
authority need not exist along each dimension of influence. Instead, the
distribution of influence is better accomplished through differentiation
in the input and output oriented roles of functional and project
managers, respectively-although joint involvement by both managers in
the area of organizational rewards is significantly related to higher
project performance.
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-30-
Finally, it should be reemphasized that the loci of influence in
most of our sampled projects do not match our normative findings. This
may be one reason why so many studies have reported vast levels of role
conflict and ambiguity among matrixed professionals (e.g., Hill and
White, 1979). Perhaps it has been the lack of a clear understanding of
how to differentiate and complement the different areas of internal and
external influences that has led to so much stress and frustration in
implementing and maintaining matrix-type designs. Clearly, more research
is needed to understand how to staff and manage individuals in these more
complicated structures, and hopefully, the findings presented here will
encourage additional research in that direction.
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